From Athens to Edo: Virtue, Law and Christian Ethics in Comparative Context by Doak Kevin M.
〔15〕
Kevin M. Doak
This paper suggests that we think of virtue not as one thing, but as 
two. By referring to “Two Virtues,” I do not mean two particular virtues, 
like courage or temperance, but two completely different traditions of 
understanding the meaning of virtue. I call one tradition the “Sophist 
Virtue,” and the other tradition, “the Socratic Virtue.” These two traditions 
of thinking about virtue are not limited to ancient Greece or even to the West, 
but still have a particular bearing on all societies, Japan as well as those in 
the West. I demonstrate the universality of these two traditions of thinking 
about virtue by exploring briefly the thinking of two leading Japanese neo-
Confucianists of the late seventeenth century, Itō Jinsai and Ogyū Sorai, 
and the Edo period merchant academy called the Kaitokudō. I also show 
the relevance of these two systems of virtue for understanding the early 20th 
century book Bushido by Nitobe Inazō. I conclude by suggesting that the 
only possibility for reconciling these two traditions of understanding virtue 
lies in law, particularly because law embodies elements of both traditions 
of virtue within it.
I. Sophist Virtue
Firstly, we will examine “Sophist Virtue.” This sense of “Virtue” 
emerged with the Sophists in Greece around the 5th century B.C. For the 
Sophists, virtue (aretē) is merely a formal skill, particularly rhetoric, that is 
unconnected to any moral philosophy or principle of unchanging Truth. We 
find traces of this concept of virtue in the English language even today, for 
instance, in the idea of a virtuoso, someone who is good at something. That 
‘something’ may be a morally indifferent act (athletics, music) or more rarely, 
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even something most of us would consider immoral (eg., a professional 
assassin). For example, Golgo 13, the hitman in the popular anime series 
of that name, is a “virtuoso” in this sense. But we would not consider him 
“virtuous” in the usual moral sense. This Sophist sense of virtue seems linked 
to certain historical, social and cultural conditions that are common among 
affluent countries. Tanaka Kōtarō, the Chief Justice of the Japanese Supreme 
Court during the 1950s, wrote in 1927 that he found parallels between 5th 
century B.C. Greece and Japan that was benefitting from the economic effects 
of its victory in the First World War. Tanaka found a Sophist approach to 
virtue among post-World War I Japanese intellectuals who turned from a 
traditional interest in philosophy as a search for Truth toward a journalism 
that sought only to satisfy the demands of the masses. Much of what he 
found in 1920s Japan applies today not only to Japan, but also to the United 
States and to much of Europe. Under the new-found affluence of post-World 
War I Japan, the traditional focus on natural philosophy was replaced by the 
Sophist interest in man himself, and in society and the State. We might think 
of this as a move from natural science to social science, or even from science 
itself to engineering. The key objective was not to know what is real, what 
it true, what is enduring, but rather how to best manipulate knowledge to 
achieve certain pre-ordained goals. 
Like today’s postmodernists, the Sophists had envisioned themselves 
as proud carriers of a new form of knowledge that came from and was 
oriented towards populist culture. They sought to destroy the traditional 
Greek understanding that law and the State (polis) rested on the authority 
of the gods. They fancied themselves as a kind of new leadership class for 
the enlightened age of Pericles, but they were really just riding the waves of 
populist demands.1) So they flattered the Greek people with their concept 
1) Tanaka addressed the claim that Socrates was a Sophist: “To say that Socrates 
merely was continuing the work of the Sophists is a cultural historical 
speculation. And it is off the mark to say Socrates essentially completed the work 
of the Sophists. It is merely to pour new life into a concept of culture that goes no 
deeper than an empty framework.”（田中耕太郎「ソフィストと我が国の現代思
潮」『教養と文化と基礎』岩波書店、1937年、474頁。）
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that “Man is the measure of all things,” which merely tried to replace the 
traditional gods with empirical Man—a concept of human nature limited 
by personal experience. The Sophist philosophy, such that it was, was not 
in the least inspired by a passion for the Truth. That is not to say that the 
Sophists intentionally told lies; rather, they were simply indifferent to the 
Truth. As skeptics and relativists, the Sophists accepted the Truth if and 
only if it had material value for them, that is, if it could pay the bills. If not, 
the Truth was of little use to them. Their “Virtue” was expressed in giving 
long, appealing speeches; they were intoxicated with their own rhetoric, 
and hoped to intoxicate their audiences with it. Their ultimate goal, their 
greatest virtue, was the art of rhetoric, no more, no less, and rhetoric was 
used mainly for power and pleasure, not to discover the Truth. They were, 
as Tanaka noted, “surely, the greatest dark spot on ancient Greek culture.”2) 
However, this Sophist understanding of virtue was not limited to ancient 
Greece. It seems to still attract many, not only those with wealth, but also 
those with higher levels of education. As Tanaka pointed out, “When Man 
is in the process of being enlightened, he finds it most easy to succumb 
to subjectivism, relativism, and skepticism. And through the Sophists, his 
knowledge becomes populist, and a close relationship is forged in such a 
man’s thinking between rhetorical skills and the propagation of atheism.”3) 
II. Socratic Virtue
What then of the Socratic tradition of virtue? How could it have been 
any different from the Sophist view of virtue? Did Socrates, the rational 
philosopher, actually worship the Greek gods? Was he not on trial for his 
“atheism”? Neo-Sophists, knowing that Socrates himself started off as a 
Sophist, have tried to spin Socrates into an atheist like themselves, but to do 
so they have had to overlook a few inconvenient facts. Firstly, the fact that 
Socrates, after taking the hemlock, asked Crito to offer a cock as a sacrifice 




did believe in spirit and therefore, logically, in spiritual beings.” What he 
rejected was the gods of the poets which he contrasted to the gods of the 
philosophers.4) “The gods of the poets” referred to a sense of power that 
rested in language as it was used to emotionally impact people—regardless 
of the truth content of that language. It was what the Sophists worshipped: 
rhetoric as a manipulative technique. More important for our exploration into 
virtue is that Socrates died for his witness to the Truth; his understanding 
of virtue was not a pandering to the masses but was grounded in his belief 
in universal principle. What is Socratic virtue, then? In the first place, it is 
deeply connected to philosophy which, in contrast to rhetoric, is centrally 
concerned with what is universally true. As James Schall has put it, Socrates’s 
point is that “nothing guarantees virtue but philosophy, the philosophy of 
what is. …we are not safe until and unless we see and acknowledge the point 
of what is right.”5)
This “Socratic” Virtue has been further explained by Romano 
Guardini in his wonderful book, Learning the Virtues. For Guardini, virtue 
is fundamentally an attitude that sees order in the world. As Guardini 
notes, “He who has this disposition sees also the order in history, sees that 
profound laws prevail there, that everything has its cause and nothing 
is without effect. The Greeks expressed this by the concept of themis, 
according to which all human activity is regulated by divine law and justice. 
Consequently, this virtue signifies a relation to the whole of existence and 
enables us to discover aspects of it which never become clear to the one who 
lives in disorder.”6) But it is perhaps, once again, Tanaka Kōtarō who has 
the clearest understanding of what is Socratic Virtue in contrast to Sophist 
Virtue. Tanaka cites the famous definition of virtue that Socrates offers in 
Xenophon, “Virtue is Knowledge,” as an important starting point. But it is 
4) James V. Schall, The Life of the Mind (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2006), pp. 83-84.
5) James V. Schall, Roman Catholic Political Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2004), pp. 37-38.
6) Romano Guardini, Learning the Virtues That Lead You to God (Manchester, N.H.: 
Sophia Institute Press, 1998), p. 7.
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key to understand that this is a knowledge, unlike Sophist rhetoric, that takes 
reality as its subject matter.
As Tanaka put it, “the Sophists are not in the least concerned with what 
kind of influence their education may have on the future of the Athenian 
State (polis), whereas Socrates taught as though what he had to offer was of 
essential importance to Athens.”7) He was an Athenian, faithful to Athenian 
tradition, not an itinerant teacher who would teach anyone for money, as 
the Sophists did. At the same time, in contrast to the skeptical individualism 
of the Sophists, Socrates taught timeless general principles and ideals that 
every person could use as the premise for his own conduct. These virtues—
things like chastity, justice, wisdom—were not left to the choice of the 
individual, but were objective principles that could shape the direction of 
human behavior for the better. When Socrates said “Virtue is Knowledge,” 
he meant that an average person can look at his own life and see these virtues 
as relevant. He did not mean “knowledge” in a passive way: knowledge of 
the Good was not sufficient in itself. It had to be used, put into action, as 
an objective for one’s actual behavior. We see this emphasis on acting in 
Tanaka’s translation of the concept of virtue as “correct behavior” (tadashii 
okonai; 正しい行い).8)
Socrates balanced the particular and the universal, his local Athenian 
culture and universal truth, in his teaching that virtue had to be put into 
action. Virtue was not a mere abstraction but had practical value. However, 
in contrast to the Sophists, Socrates held that the virtuous life was good 
for Athens precisely because its goal was the completion of personhood or 
“character,” what Tanaka called in Japanese, jinkaku no kansei (人格の完成).
III. Sophist Virtue and Socratic Virtue in Japanese History
It would be too easy, perhaps, to limit Socratic and Sophist Virtues to a 
mere expression of Greek, or perhaps Western, culture. Doing so, however, 




else recapitulate the Sophist theory that there is no universal truth. But in 
fact, Japan has maintained something like Socratic Virtue throughout the 
centuries. Even as a Christian, Tanaka Kōtarō recognized Japan’s non-
Christian traditional virtues as “sincere mores and beautiful customs” (Junpū 
bizoku; 醇風美俗) and he praised their moral integrity. He gave particular 
credit to Confucianism for strengthening the virtue of the Japanese people, 
saying that;
The arrival of Confucianism had a profound influence on the 
politics and morals of our country and thus it came to have a great 
significance on education also. …Its influence in the area of morality 
was particularly great. …It gave a rich and concrete substance to the 
concept of morality (dōtoku = lit., “the way of virtue”) through its basic 
principles of the Five Cardinal Virtues (Benevolence, Righteousness, 
Etiquette, Wisdom, and Faith), that is through the moral precepts of the 
Natural Law. And by correctly explaining human ethics, Confucianism 
gave us the ability to correct our ancient evil customs like marriages 
between a son and his mother-in-law, between half-siblings, and 
between a son and his step-mother. Confucianism emphasized human 
ethics, but that was really no more than concepts based on the Natural 
Law. Confucianism is a secular, especially political, philosophy that 
doesn’t discuss the afterlife. And so Confucianism has been the basic 
ideal that has consistently dominated our educational philosophy since 










From Athens to Edo 21
We will take a closer look at virtue discourse in Japanese history. The 
discourse on virtue (toku; 徳) is broad-ranging in Japanese spiritual history, 
and involves Daoist, Confucian, Buddhist, Shinto and other sources. 
Here, I will restrict myself to a few comments about 17th and 18th century 
Japanese Neo-Confucianism, with a brief look at Nitobe Inazō’s early 20th 
century study on Bushido. During the Tokugawa period (1603-1867), Neo-
Confucianism reached its apogee of influence in Japan. And during this 
period, we can identify two influential Neo-Confucian philosophers each of 
whom represented the Socratic or Sophist approach to virtue: I will offer Itō 
Jinsai (1627-1705) as the exemplar of Socratic virtue and Ogyū Sorai as the 
representative of the Sophist virtue.
Beginning with Itō Jinsai, we find an explicit discourse on virtue (toku) 
that is based on an eclectic approach to moral philosophy, drawing on Neo-
Confucianism to be sure, but going beyond the confines of Confucian thought 
to look closely at Japanese cultural practices through language. According to 
Tetsuo Najita, “Itō emphasized the horizontality of universal human value 
rather than the conventional distinctions between ‘high’ and ‘low,’ between 
those who governed and those who were governed. …For Itō, the potential of 
acting out goodness thus replaced the necessity of change as the ontological 
basis for articulating human ‘equality’.”10) Government officials kept a close 
eye on Itō Jinsai. Although he was not forced to drink hemlock as Socrates 
was, he was required to submit written materials for inspection in 1683 
because he was suspected of violating certain government proscriptions.11) 
What was the government worried about? Given that only two years later 
the government established in Nagasaki a new office to examine imported 
Chinese books for any potential reference to Christianity, and in light of Itō’s 
dangerous idea of equality across social classes, we cannot rule out that the 
government suspected Itō of harboring dangerous Christian ideas. William 
10) Tetsuo Najita, Visions of Virtue in Tokugawa Japan: The Kaitokudō Merchant 
Academy of Osaka (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 28.
11) William J. Farge, S.J., A Christian Samurai: The Trials of Baba Bunkō (Washington 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 2016), p. 91.
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Farge has recently traced a similarly exceptional embrace of the universality 
of human value, regardless of class, by Baba Bunkō (1718-59), discovering 
that Baba’s values did come from Catholic missionaries in Japan. Conclusive 
evidence for a similar discovery of Itō Jinsai as a hidden Christian is unlikely 
ever to be found. However, we cannot rule out influence from ancient Greek 
notions of moral virtue that appears to have reached Itō through writings 
and ideas disseminated by Christians in late 17th century Japan. Kagawa 
Toyohiko wrote that “it is a real possibility that Itō received his insight into 
the Christian idea of love from the Dutch traders who frequented Japan 
at that time. According to the tradition of his family, Itō hid himself in a 
warehouse for two weeks and studied Christianity with Dutch Christians 
as his teachers.”12)
Without going so far as to conclude that Itō Jinsai was himself Christian, 
we can easily think of him as a moral philosopher akin to Plato for whom 
“God” was “the Good” (Agathon).13) Plato, like his mentor Socrates, also 
saw virtue as more than a mere technical skill: it was inherently tied up with 
doing moral good. In his terms, Agathon (the Good) was aretē (virtue), and 
virtue was the Good. Likewise, for Itō, who was drawing from Mencius, 
the fundamental truth of virtue rests on the conviction that Man’s nature is 
good. And, like Plato and Socrates, Itō believed that knowing the good was 
not enough: one can, and should, do good.
If Itō Jinsai represents the Socratic tradition of virtue in Japan, Ogyū Sorai 
(1666-1728) looks like a Sophist. Sorai was born several decades after Jinsai, 
which means that he spent much of his adulthood in the Genroku Period 
(1688-1704). The Genroku Period witnessed rapid economic growth and the 
rise of a vibrant urban culture that was based in Edo, Kyoto and particularly 
in Osaka. It created social and economic conditions remarkably similar to 
Greece in the 5th century B.C. which saw the rise of the Sophists. But the 
12) Toyohiko Kagawa, Christ and Japan (1934), excerpted and reprinted as “The 
Religious Life of the Japanese,” Japan Christian Review 62 (1996), pp. 67-73, at 
p. 72.
13) Guardini, Learning the Virtues, p. 9.
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similarities between Sorai and the Sophists were not merely historical, social 
or economic. His thinking on virtue (toku) bears remarkable similarities to 
that of the Sophists on aretē. “For Ogyū Sorai, society had no need of ethical 
norms, because there was in fact no such thing as any absolute principle. 
…Virtue in Tokugawa Neo-Confucianism could be spoken about only in 
reference to the samurai class. …When Sorai later became an advisor to 
Shogun Tokugawa Yoshimune (1684-1751), he encouraged practicality 
and leniency in dealing with the commoner population. …In the end, 
however, Sorai concluded that the Neo-Confucianists could not understand 
or teach the real meaning of virtue because they interpreted the ancient 
words and expressions using contemporary definitions.”14) Truth was lost 
behind language, or as the Sophists would say, “rhetoric,” or as today’s 
postmodernists would say, “discourse.”
Nonetheless, Sorai did teach that each person should polish his own 
“little virtue” (shōtoku) that had been implanted in him at birth. However, 
these innumerable “little virtues” were cut off from any ontological 
foundation in the Great Virtue which was exclusive to the ancient kings and 
not graspable by human beings in later times.15) The late nineteenth century 
Japanese political activist Nakae Chōmin found a strain of utilitarianism in 
Ogyū Sorai’s thought similar to that in Jeremy Bentham16). For our purposes 
here, we might say that both Bentham and Sorai were thinking of virtue in 
the utilitarian manner of the Sophists. Virtue was merely a measure of the 
skill with which one dealt with the tasks society had given one.
In light of Sorai’s official position as a government ideologue and the 
general presumption that Japanese philosophy was, if it is not still, largely 
utilitarian in substance, it might be tempting to think that Itō’s Socratic 
virtue was a minor exception to Sorai who provided the norm for Japanese 
discourse on virtue as technique. But before leaping to that hasty conclusion, 
we should pause and consider the remarkable school called the Kaitokudō 
14) Farge, S.J., A Christian Samurai, pp. 125-127.
15) Najita, Visions of Virtue, p. 33.
16) Ibid., p. 35.
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(“The Hall That Yearns for Virtue”) that taught virtue ethics to the merchant 
class in Osaka between the years 1724 and 1869. Two things stand out about 
the Kaitokudō: one, that it had the audacity to teach merchants at a time 
when knowledge was presumed to be reserved for the samurai class; and 
two, the school was highly critical of Sorai. Tetsuo Najita has articulated 
the grounds of the Kaitokudō’s opposition to Sorai’s approach to virtue: 
“one of the key intellectual themes in the Kaitokudō,” he notes, “was the 
confirmation that the human mind could know objective things and deal 
with them without being arbitrary. Thus in contrast for example to Ogyū 
Sorai who insisted that natural objects could not be known as their ultimate 
secrets were infinite, the tendency at the Kaitokudō was to see external 
nature as less mystical, to consider it as provisionally knowable, and to 
calculate in ways that were within reason. Nature, in other words, was not 
simply an emotive external object but a measurable set of things.”17) The 
Kaitokudō’s anti-Sorai thinking reached its zenith in the late 18th century 
under Nakai Chikuzan (1730-1804), but enduring elements continued down 
to the end of the school in 1869. It should come as no surprise that Nakai 
Tsugumaro (1855-1943), the eldest son of Nakai Tōen (1822-81) the last head 
of the Kaitokudō, not only worked hard in the early twentieth century to re-
open the Kaitokudō but was baptized “Paul” in the Christian faith. He also 
worked closely with Archbishop Nikolai Kasatkin in translating Orthodox 
Christian works into Japanese. He was merely following the mainstream line 
laid out two hundred years earlier in the Kaitokudō by the virtue ethics of 
Itō Jinsai who had studied with Christians and incorporated their idea of the 
equality of men and the knowability of virtue into his ideas.
Finally, a brief examination in this context of Nitobe Inazō’s Bushido: 
the Soul of Japan. This remarkable book was written in English in 1899, right 
around the time that Paul Nakai was trying to re-establish the Kaitokudō 
from his Christian sense of virtue. Nitobe’s book, still in print today, has 
often been interpreted as an instance of the Sophist line of virtue as aretē, 
mere techniques that shaped the warrior ethos of the samurai. This is a gross 
17) Ibid., pp. 89-90.
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mis-reading of the book. Nitobe, one of modern Japan’s most important 
Christian educators, expressly wrote the book to provide a Japanese form 
of the Christian chivalry that had characterized medieval Europe. It was 
written to show English readers that Japan was not a barbaric culture devoid 
of moral principles. And while Nitobe characterized his Bushido as “the 
noblesse oblige of the warrior class,” he also asserted that Bushido was 
not limited to the military class but had “its influence among the masses.18) 
Rather than technical skills with the sword, his Bushido was composed 
of familiar sounding Socratic moral virtues such as “Justice,” “Courage,” 
“Benevolence,” “Politeness,” “Veracity,” “Honour,””the Duty of Loyalty,” 
and “Self-Control.” In short, what Nitobe achieved in his eloquent book is 
nothing less than a synthesis of Sophist virtue and Socratic virtue: virtue as 
amoral technique is there, especially in “Chapter XIII The Sword, the Soul 
of the Samurai.”
However, it is Socratic virtue that runs throughout the volume and 
defines Nitobe’s main argument on Bushido. Thus, Nitobe concludes that 
“Bushido as an independent code of ethics may vanish, but its power will 
not perish from the earth; its schools of martial prowess or civic honour may 
be demolished, but its light and its glory will long survive their ruins.”19) He 
then closes his book on Bushido with a quote from a Quaker—reinforcing the 
long relationship of Socratic virtue with Universalist articulations of virtue 
as a moral code premised on recognition of what is real. In short, Nitobe, the 
Christian educator, was prophesying that the universal virtues implicit in 
Bushido and developed over the centuries in Japanese culture will remain, 
even as the technical skill with the sword declines. He believed that even in 
Japan Socratic virtue would eventually triumph over Sophist virtue.
IV. Law as Reconciling the Competing Virtues
The competition between Sophist virtue and Socratic virtue throughout 
18) Inazō Nitobe, Bushido: the Soul of Japan (Rutland VT: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 
1969), p. 3.
19) Ibid., p. 192.
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human history could, if left unchecked, lead to anarchy or worse. These 
rival understandings of virtue are mutually incompatible. In the Sophist 
tradition of virtue we find a valorization of skill, pure and simple: the good 
is whatever is done well, and whatever is done well is by definition “the 
good.” There is in this Sophist tradition of virtue no room for the mediocre 
man, the clumsy person, as having any “good” in himself. We have seen 
over time how this Sophist tradition of virtue has led to things like eugenics 
and euthanasia—the “mercy killing” of those deemed unfit for society’s 
needs. On the other hand, we have the Socratic tradition that upholds the 
universality of Truth and moral principles founded on Truth. This Socratic 
virtue has emphasized “what is real,” and finds this reality in all cultures and 
historical periods. Left unchecked, however, the Socratic tradition of virtue is 
open to use by extremists whose over-confidence in their own understanding 
of moral universals has led to imperialism, religious fanaticism and 
terrorism. Less dramatically, Socratic moral virtue can simply lead to social 
disintegration, as healthy economic, social and political institutions are 
undermined by a moralism that can be quite indifferent to institutions and 
how well they do or do not function. Think of the “British Disease” of the 
1970s or, in certain respects, many of the social problems the United States 
faces today, problems that are often exacerbated by moralist discourse that 
appropriates the Socratic language of virtue on “universal Truth,” “equality” 
and “the dignity of the person” with little consideration for the dignity and 
rights of those who don’t agree with their novel moral conclusions. So, we 
must recognize that the differences between the Sophist understanding of 
virtue and the Socratic understanding of virtue are profound, serious, and 
irreconcilable. And we also need to recognize that both traditions of virtue 
have elements that can be destructive to individuals, societies and traditions.
Precisely because these differences between Sophist and Socratic virtue 
are so serious, today we need to make a renewed commitment to the rule of 
law. Law is the only institution capable of reconciling these tensions between 
the Sophist and Socratic concepts of virtue—or if not reconciling them, at 
least establishing a modus vivendi between them. Why law? Because the law 
itself uniquely encompasses elements of both the Sophist and the Socratic 
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understandings of virtue: it has room for both traditions of virtue within 
it. Like the Sophists, the law places a premium on technicality and even 
on the effects of rhetoric. The technical nature of the law is most apparent 
in areas of private law (corporate law, property law, etc.) which are also 
those areas of law most free from local traditions. Also like the Sophists, 
the law as we have it today does not seek its legitimacy in divine origins 
or sacred kingship but in fact generally treats all people as equal. Yet, like 
the Socratic understanding of virtue, the law is not merely reducible to 
technique: without moorings in a sense of justice—a cardinal virtue—the 
law is not recognizable as law. Also, like the Socratic sense of virtue, the 
law presumes it is dealing with reality, a recognition of “what is,” without 
which it loses its own raison d’ être which is to establish order and to do so 
by minimizing violence.
Here we are reminded of Guardini’s point that virtue is an attitude 
that sees order in the world. The alternative to law is of course to resort to 
violence to resolve conflict, and violence has shown itself to be a poor tool 
for establishing and maintaining order in society. These Socratic aspects of 
the law are most apparent in public law (esp. constitutional law and criminal 
law) where the particular traditions of a given society have more weight, 
just as Athens meant so much to Socrates. So we see even in the structure 
of law itself elements in common with the Sophists (e.g., technicality, social 
equality, atheism, cultural deracination) and with the Socratics (e.g., realism, 
substantivity, justice, respect for local traditions). This commonality means 
that whether Sophist or Socratic, everyone should be able to find a means of 
appreciating the law and its relation to virtue—however understood.
It is law’s relationship to virtue that reminds us that law is not merely 
an institutional form of conflict resolution. It is also a form of education, 
even education in morality. Of course, in teaching virtue, law differs from 
religious education in several respects. Firstly, religious education sets high 
standards that few, if anyone, can attain. Only a “saint” or a “holy man” can 
achieve all the standards of religious education—and even then, often not in 
this life. By the same token, this demanding religious education in society 
is left to the freedom of the individual’s choice and conscience—at least in 
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those societies where the rule of law prevails. In contrast, law, in its capacity 
as moral education, takes “the average man” as its standard. This is an 
important point, given the coercive powers of law. Religion does not have the 
coercive powers of the law. Disobey your priest or minister and you remain 
free—free perhaps to join another church or religion, but free. Disobey the 
law and you can be imprisoned and/or fined. This is why it is essential that 
law does not maintain a standard that most people cannot meet. Indeed, the 
law expects, on average, everyone to uphold all its standards.
These standards can be technical rather than moral: the law determines 
which side of the road you may drive your car on, what forms contracts must 
adopt to be valid, which pieces of paper constitute valid currency or forms 
of payment, etc. In all these cases, the law teaches the virtue of technical 
skill. But the law also adopts standards that are moral: you may not kill, 
steal, defraud, etc.—no matter how skillful you are at such things! In these 
cases, the law teaches the virtue of doing good and avoiding evil. Note that 
these moral standards in the law are derived from the Natural Law. They 
are not the property of a particular religion but are moral principles that are 
accessible by reason—but which, by the way, most religions also recognize. 
Without such Natural Law moral principles, the law would indeed be 
reduced to a technical game, and there would be no room in it for the Socratic 
tradition of virtue. However, an equally important, if frequently overlooked, 
fact is that without the amoral, technical nature of the law, anarchy would 
result—just imagine if the law were silent on matters like which side of the 
road you must drive your car on! Both the technical side of law and the 
moral side of law converge on the key point that order lies at the heart of 
true virtue. 
Tanaka Kōtarō, an expert on both the law and on religion, has laid out, in 
compelling terms, the difference between religion and law as forms of moral 
education and as types of law. Building on a distinction between religious 
law (rippō; 律法) and secular law (hōritsu; 法律), he wrote that:
When compared with the noble religious law (rippō), the secular law is 
quite base. If the secular law (hōritsu) were something that Man could 
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not implement in ordinary circumstances, we would have to say that 
is not an appropriate kind of law. This is because secular law (hōritsu) 
is satisfied with the standard of those external acts required for the 
maintenance of social order. However, religious law (rippō) enters into 
one’s motives and demands the highest standards of purity. What it 
seeks is what is right from God’s perspective, regardless of whether 
that is a standard for maintaining social order.20)
Tanaka highlights the distinctive missions that the law and religion have, 
without sacrificing the good of either. Their relationship—and their potential 
for good—is more apparent when we see law and religion within organized 
social life. 
Here, Tanaka invites us to think of the State and Church as modes of 
organizing law and religion socially. It should be noted that neither law nor 
religion are fully equivalent to the State or the Church. Law precedes the 
state, as the Natural Law attests; and there are plenty of examples today of 
people who practice a kind of “spiritual religion” without joining a church. 
They often describe themselves as “spiritual” but not religious. But when 
we consider the function of law and religion within the institutions of the 
State and the Church, the basic attribute of Socratic virtue—a sense of order 
as essential to the flourishing of Man—becomes apparent. This is why both 
the State and the Church can be seen as perfect societies (societas perfecta): the 
one, providing order to Man’s secular life, and the other as providing order 
to Man’s spiritual life; neither is a mere functional society (shokunō-teki shakai) 











moral order and in doing so serve the general end of Man.22)
Today, we are too quick to think that the law is inextricably linked to the 
State, and we are too slow to see that the law has a legitimate role within 
the Church. Many of us have been influenced, willy-nilly, by Rudolph 
Sohm’s rejection of canon law. “Ecclesiastical law,” he maintained, “stands 
in contradiction to the nature of the Ecclesia.” In accepting this claim, we 
have perhaps done an injustice to the Sophist tradition of virtue as technique.
Tanaka was quick to see the problem, arguing that Sohm’s rejection of canon 
law came from his one-sided emphasis on law as the imposition of justice. 
Sohm overlooked the other side of law that is technical. Church law, like 
secular law, combines both technical and moral law, and we should not 
dismiss the value of technical law even within religious organizations, 
for that is where law functions to maintain order, as it does in all social 
organizations.23) This more technical side of law also reminds us that law 
takes Man as he is and does not ask the impossible of him. This is what 
jurists have called, in a positive sense, “the compromising nature of law” 
(Kompromissnatur des Rechts).24) It is because of this compromising nature of 
law that the State, even with its powers of coercion, can be seen as instructing 
people under its authority to live more virtuous lives. And this effort to 
live more virtuous lives cannot be restricted to individual moral ideals, as 
Sohm would have it. Virtue also requires a social context for action, and 
both Church and State in their respective ways, provide that social order 
for virtuous action.
The mission of the State, as Tanaka noted, is to help us realize the Biblical 
injunction to “be perfect, as your Heavenly Father is perfect” (Matt 5:48). 
Of course, Tanaka also understood that the State alone cannot improve 
either society or the individual. He called that idea “rank utopianism.” He 
recognized that the majority of states in history, at best, were merely groping 
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yes, including the Church—to remind the State that its basic mission is to 
set down the conditions for the realization of the ideal of Man. These basic 
conditions are visible in Georg Jellinek’s idea that “law is nothing more 
than the minimum morality.” Those minimum standards of morality are 
obligatory, enforced by the State through the law. But, as individuals, we 
need to go beyond the minimum and seek higher religious standards as we 
see fit, through our freedom of conscience.
Law then can and should work to reconcile the oppositions between a 
Sophist understanding of virtue as technique freed from a particular moral 
content and a Socratic understanding of virtue as based on a specific claim 
about what is true and real. It will achieve this reconciliation through the 
State which will not impose the fullness of morality on its citizens (to the 
delight of the Sophists) but will not be indifferent to claims of justice and 
morality (to the delight of the Socratics). But for Law to succeed in reconciling 
the relativism of the neo-Sophists and the objectivism of the Socratics, there is 
one particular virtue that is required from both sides: the virtue of tolerance. 
Tanaka claims that this virtue of “tolerance” is an essential virtue for any 
democracy to function, and I think he is right. However, we also need to 
understand that by “tolerance” he does not mean the kind of tolerance that 
we hear so much about these days, often an attack on traditional morals and 
virtue under the cover of rhetoric about “tolerating difference.”
Tanaka uses the Japanese word kan’yō (寛容) which might be better 
translated as “generosity” or “magnanimity.” The component characters 
for kan’yō mean “broad, relaxed” and “to behave, to take in.” It does not 
convey the same degree of passivity one finds in the sense of “tolerance” 
common in current public discourse—to put up with something unpleasant 
or even toxic. Fortunately, both the Sophists and Socratics accept this kind 
of broad-minded tolerance within their systems of virtue. The neo-Sophists 
cannot object to the virtue of tolerance, since without a specific substantive 
moral claim of their own, they have to tolerate all sorts of different moral 
claims—even as they use them when beneficial to their own arguments. 
And the Socratics usually hold a substantive system of virtues that, as 
Guardini notes, lead to a God or gods who overlooks all—tolerance for 
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them is an inherent part of their moral philosophy in which God, not Man, 
holds the monopoly on vengeance. If we can enhance social attitudes of true 
“tolerance” (kan’yō), along with a renewed respect for the rule of law and the 
State as its instrument, then perhaps we may be able to avoid the doomsday 
scenarios frequently intoned today and maintain a vibrant, moral, global 
democratic culture.
Finally, we leave you with the words of Tanaka Kōtarō who in 1927 faced 
the same problems we are still facing today. He said:
We are truly now in a period when we must understand the character 
of Socrates and once again take up the study of his philosophy [which] 
…breathed a soul into the superficial culture of the Sophists through 
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Abstract
This article identifies two different traditions of understanding what 
virtue is, both of which originated in ancient Greece but became global 
in reach. One tradition is the Socratic understanding of virtue and the 
other tradition is the Sophist understanding of virtue. After outlining the 
distinguishing features of these different traditions and their historical, 
philosophical and economic conditions, the article then turns to 17th century 
Japan, finding advocates of these understandings of virtue in neo-Confucian 
philosophers Itō Jinsai (1627-1705) and Ogyū Sorai (1666-1728). Arguing that 
Jinsai’s understanding of virtue was akin to the Socratic tradition and Ogyū’s 
was in line with the Sophist tradition, the article then raises the possibility 
of Christian influences on Jinsai and shows how his understanding of virtue 
was continued on for nearly two centuries in the Osaka merchant academy, 
the Kaitokudō (1724-1869). This long tradition of privileging Socratic virtue 
within the Kaitokudō helps explain the conversion of the son of the last 
head of the Kaitokudō, Nakai Tsugumaro (1855-1943) to Christianity. In 
a similar vein, one finds both the Socratic and Sophist understandings of 
virtue in the Christian intellectual Nitobe Inazō’s early 20th century writing 
on bushido. Finally, the article notes that without some mechanism for 
reconciling these two opposing understandings of virtue, societies run the 
risk of disintegration. The author concludes that the best hope for such 
reconciliation lies in the field of law, since law by its very nature embodies 
elements of both the Socratic and the Sophist understanding of virtue. 

